Please feel free to check out my new Picasa album. It is a select set of photos from my first weekend in San Francisco. Tell me what you like.
Engadget - Google Slides out "prize service" for contests...
I am so glad that Google is beta testing this service. This will make people get used to actually receiving real prizes for their online activities. When our service launches in the late Summer/early Fall, that will make our job of getting mindshare SO much easier. Thanks Google, competition is what makes this country great right?
Evolution in the Daily Deals Industry
Not to toot my own horn, but I reached many of the same conclusions. While Groupon may stumble at some point in the immediate future, the daily deals industry is a very strong force and with the appropriate adjustments made by a well-positioned player(s), it could challenge (or usurp) traditional print advertising. Valpak, you are officially on notice.
Very interesting response to the group buying concerns circling the web at the moment.
Worth a read!
A fun(if completely serious) retort to Rocky Agrawal’s article “How daily deal companies could improve the merchant experience — and why they won’t”
If you are not an avid reader of Tech Crunch(you should be), you may not be aware that they have recently had a series of guest posts by LBT-specialist Rocky Agrawal(@rakeshlobster) on GroupOn and the daily deals industry as a whole. Many defenders of GroupOn have painted Rocky as some sort of evil bad-hype-generator, so he decided to write a post on his personal blog to show how he thinks daily deals companies could improve their offering. The points made are all good ones, but they are sullied somewhat by a cynical one-liner to explain why the companies would not go for said improvements. I would like to take these points one at a time and examine his suggestions while also putting his nay-saying to the test.
Daily deals are poised to become an incredibly powerful medium for small-business marketing. It removes the one obstacle small businesses have to marketing - up-front capital. The dangers are obvious: over-selling, selling product below cost, existing customer participation, and lack of new customer conversion tools. Let’s start looking at way’s to improve this with Rocky’s first suggestion:
Limit the number of deals people can buy in a set period of time. This would discourage deal habituation. (Of course, this isn’t in the deal company’s interests. Hardcore cheapskates would just setup multiple accounts.)
This is a sound suggestion, if you limited it to say one deal in this category per week. That promotes exploration of new businesses within a broad category, but avoids habituation(to say, buy a deal for dinner every night). Rocky, in criticizing his own suggestion, fails to see that there are numerous ways to authenticate an account seamlessly - Facebook and Twitter integration, credit card information, etc. There is of course a way in which someone could - if they had to - get around this, but that is truly a straw man. It may represent less than 1% of daily deals customers. Next, please:
Limit the distance from the business that a purchaser can be. e.g. you can only buy deals within 5 miles of your home. This would discourage people who are 30 miles away and are willing to drive to save a few bucks one time. The farther away you are, the less likely you are to become a regular. (Of course, this isn’t in the deal company’s interests.)
This is a non-starter to be sure. You live in San Francisco or Chicago or New York this might work. You live in Indianapolis, IN? Or a suburb of such city? Good luck. To go to all but the most everyday places, you have to put on your car and go outside this range. Now, allowing the business itself to set location boundaries that are more specific than the generic “Chicago” variety would be a positive step. I mean, you might not go 10 miles to go to Suzy’s Cafe, but you might to get laser hair removal. Now, Rocky says that this is not in the companies interest(a recurring theme, as you’ll see soon). Why? No real reason I guess, but I would assume he means that this would sell less deals and therefore less revenue. But a client may agree to a deal that leads to more profitable income if they are able to tailor it to meet their needs. And the deals just may work better for the business, leading them to refer more businesses to the service. So they have similar revenue with a higher margin. Moving on….
Limit customers based on demographic criteria. (Of course, this isn’t in the deal company’s interests.)
This could help, but then again, it might not. When you are paying for print or web advertising ahead of time, you have to ensure that you are targeting your demo. But if you are just offering a deal to anyone with the cash, then you can be more open(this can help a business itself, in getting it out of a demographically-based box). If this is something businesses are interested in, offer it at a premium. That makes the deal in the deal company’s interest, maybe less revenue, but higher margins. This might not always work as I said though, some businesses can generate serious new business by operating outside their normal demo. Next suggestion.
Reduce the minimum discount for the offer. (This will drive down volume.)
Again, same as above, you might be putting volume down, but margins will increase. And as Rocky is oft to point out, an IPO-bound company like Groupon might not be down with this, but there is a daily deals company out there that could work with this. If not, I guess I need to a second start up. I hear VCs love daily deals companies….
Provide customer contact information to merchants so that they can follow up and invite repeat visits. This has privacy issues and would reduce the need for a business to do another run with deal company.
This is a pretty poor way to attack a really big opportunity. Keep the data, but allow customer to interact with the customer pseudonymously through Groupon, etc’s web portal. This is a great way to actually build a relationship with the client and sell them on further deals. Also, could help in driving new metrics tools for the company.
Train businesses on best practices for inspiring repeat visits, such as getting follows/likes, collecting email addresses. This would have operational impact (training time) plus it reduces the need to do another placement with the deal company.
There is no need for specific training here. A set of instructional videos would do the same, as well as a client support rep. The most important thing is ramping up metrics data and usage data so the business understands the scope of what they are getting into. The real training need here is ensuring that customers have a way to track the sales made through a Groupon/daily deal. These sites should be supplying some sort of reference tools. This is very much in the interest of the company and could help to expand the desire to place another deal. Provide real value to the client, and they will come back.
Send out reminder emails. Hey, it’s been 3 months since you redeemed the Groupon at X. Have you thought about going back there? (They’d rather sell you a deal for another restaurant where they can make a fat margin.)
Useful, if implemented correctly. If you turn this into a Groupon-run loyalty program, you could check-in at the business with a Groupon linked account and earn special return customer deals. Another revenue source if you are creative.
Restrict deals to new customers only. This, in my mind, is the most dangerous part of Groupon and the like. You give up 75% of revenue to “acquire” customers you already had. I was talking to one merchant and he was visibly despondent when he was talking about seeing his regulars in line with a Groupon.
Great idea, but how do you implement? One way is having customers sign-up for above loyalty program before the deal is run. But there is another danger here, alienating regulars who see new customers getting fat discounts. But this could be crafted to be a win-win.
Advise businesses to set their Groupon redemption value such that it doesn’t entirely cover the cost of meals and the customer has to pay some portion at regular retail. Cheapskates will check out the restaurant’s Web site and see that this won’t be a freebie and won’t buy the Groupon. (Deal site loses twice: discouraged cheapskates who don’t buy and commission on the portion that is paid at full retail.)
Good idea, but I don’t think this needs to be a formal advisement. They could provide a category best-practices guide once they actively track metrics. The problem is real though, volume would go down as real cheapskates might skip out - but what is the real number of those? Some daily deals clients report that as a rather low number. And that would help the deal succeed in the long-term, which might lead to increased listings. The salesperson’s commission is what’s really the painful part here, but we’ll address that later.
Allow users to opt-in to a business’s email list at the time they purchase the deal. (This would mean losing some grip over the customer relationship.)
Prompt users to follow business on Twitter at time they purchase.
Not needed, see above.
Force tipping at the time of purchase. A standard tip based on retail price could be added at time of sale. (This would deter cheapskates from buying deals.)
More options are great, but I don’t think this is the way to approach this. I would instead advise businesses to offer a 10% revenue share on Groupons/daily deals with their tipped employees. If there are some cheapskates, employee morale won’t dip too low and if tip performance is better than expected, employee morale will increase. Interesting concept though.
Enforce restrictions at the point of purchase. If a business has stated only 1 item can be purchased, this should be enforced to the best of the systems ability, like checking email addresses and credit card numbers across accounts. (This would eliminate some transactions.)
A unique ID for each purchased deal would do wonders here. Once again, simple tools. But Frauds are everywhere, and always represent a tiny percent of transactions.
Focus sales efforts on categories where the daily deal creates a real win-win, as opposed to preying on businesses who don’t know better. (This would dramatically reduce volumes and revenue.)
This final point hits home to the point. ”Sales efforts” are lame. Sales that are client-driven and organic will build the business. Having people on the streets to market the business is great, but pay should be based on uptake, not per-deal commissions. Any business should be able to create their deal with a form and a template and call from a sales rep. This reduces overhead significantly. Due diligence could be done in the background, and their only experience with the sales team could be a simple invite into the service, and a call saying that the deal is on. No hard-sales pitches, no wrangling over line items in a contract. Just, here’s the standard deal format, offer a product with this at this rate with these terms or agree to a higher rate for certain value-added services(such as detailed above).
There is no doubt that Groupon presents an interesting scenario. And though, as one player in the industry said recently, Groupon is the “whale” right now, it really is not the industry. Groupon’s focus on hard revenue growth could very well hurt them in the long run. But this just means that there is so much room in this market for a newcomer(or smaller player) to make a big play with some of the above improvements. Really, I shouldn’t even be posting this, as this set of ideas alone could be a pitch to an investor. Or maybe I’m too high on my horse right now. Rocky is just one of many bright and talented individuals working in and around this space, and I would love for one or many of them to comment and share this article to get a conversation going about the future of daily deals and LBT.
PS: I am not in the daily deals or LBT industry. I actually am working at the intersection of mobile, gaming, social, and e-commerce. This is just a really interesting though experiment.
AOL "Content Slave" teaches us a lesson about creating real value on the web
Reading this article just gave me chills. There is no doubt that Google(and all of the other search engines) have allowed us to discover content that we never would have before, but what damage has it done to the actual content being created. Google is apparently aware of this fact and went to war against so-called “content farms” by altering their search algorithm. But this can really only do so much.
This is why I hope that we see a return of the subscription, and maybe an easy way to get that done. Anyway to get the motivation to improve CPMs away from editors is good. It seems like their will be a bit of a battle over the coming years between lower-quality, higher-quantity free “journalism” and high-quality, low-quantity paid journalism. In the end I believe it comes down to scale. The prices that newspapers, blogs, and news websites want for their news to be delivered is untenable, and there is no small-scale way to gain access to their content ad-free.
If content is normally priced around $5-$9 CPM, with around 1.5 impressions per page, that means that every page view makes the publisher between 0.75c-1.35c. There has to be some way to allow a person to purchase access to streams of content that are ad-free for similar(or even higher prices). If you can not write an article that I am willing to pay 2c for, why do you exist?
Maybe what I’m proposing above would be a step backward, but one thing is for sure: media and content producers need to get their head out of their hind-end and start looking for a new model for high-quality content that could see adoption by the web at large.
TechCrunch teaches us to not be THAT guy.
I guess I should hope to not ever become that guy. And to stay clear of those that are…
As a test for my new Disqus commenting system, I’ve decided to post these three new photos I had taken for press and promotional purposes. Please tell me what you think of them, and give me your favorite. I’ve obviously chosen mine, but I would love to hear from everyone.
RT @citizenspace “Micro VCs are the best thing to happen to our industry” @msuster at #foundershowcase
Wow - Color loses Peter Pham
I have to say that it is really sad to see Peter Pham leave a company like Color. Interesting concept, but after $41 million in financing expectations for launch can be very high.
One thing I believe that can be learned from what’s going on at Color is that what’s important is the product. Color needs the largest possible install base they could get, and supporting only one platform is not the best way to do that. A private beta would have been appropriate, and would have allowed the investors to save face. It may have also allowed time for the company to more flesh out what they were looking to do. The app that was released seemed more like a feature of a more complete app.
Here’s to hoping that Peter can quickly join another start-up in Social soon. I got a sense that he is very talented and extremely passionate about enabling the next generation of social.
What Groupon tells all start-ups looking to monetize

A series of posts by Rocky Agrawal(@rakeshlobster) at TechCrunch got me really interested in a company that I had really only looked at from the periphery - Groupon. In the series, Rocky makes a pretty passionate case that GroupOn’s business model - and therefore the model being copied by all the new entrants to the local deals sector - really ends up hurting the businesses that it intends to help. But how could this be?
Groupon has exploded into an estimated $25 Billion valuation and growth into markets all over the world. Can a concept so toxic really hurt its customers so bad? And why?
The answer is most definitely yes, and really the answer why is very simple. The concept is easy to grasp, it’s positive effects are readily visible, and the negative effects are not so visible. And why else? The deals are made on the terms set by Groupon’s salespeople, not on the terms that benefit the client. And salespeople are there to make sales, it’s that simple. Especially for a company that is looking to dramatically raise revenues for an imminent IPO.
And like Rocky said, that’s not to say that Andrew Mason and crew are bad people or are looking to screw their clients. They obviously believe in their model. It is in a businesses best interest to have their clients have the best possible experience with their product or service and to refer other clients as well as return their business as well. Unless Mr. Mason - who I admittedly know little about - believes that investors are the most naive people on the planet, he could not possibly hope to just blow revenues(and apparently losses) through the roof to set the stage for a huge IPO and then subsequently watch the model crumble. There is no exit strategy there.
So if malfeasance is not the motive, then what is going on, and what can we learn from Groupon’s mistakes?
Growth driven by sales vs. Sales driven by demand
Groupon is following a tried and true 20th century model of Growth driven by hard sales. This is quite different from the web model used to draw in customers. The web - and mobile - model is to build a solid product, get the word out through organic forms of advertising, and support and iterate your product over time. The sales are driven by the quality of the product and the demand for that product.
Groupon doesn’t just want attention and mind share, they want the damn deal closed, and closed right now. They believe that despite useful metrics, usage tracking, and lack of yield management, a good businessperson will be able to overcome and prosper on Groupon’s terms.
If Groupon created strong leads to their product, and offered a more flexible product that customers could tailor to suit their actual needs - not to mention offered metrics that allowed them to see how a Groupon would affect their business over the life of the deal - there would be a lot less news in a particular business not executing the deal well. Good metrics could also help a customer during a passive sales approach in designing the deal that will work the best for them - even though it might not necessarily drive the most hard revenue.
The lesson to be learned
Local is not an area of expertise of even special attention for me. But at the end of the day, Groupon’s folly can hold great wisdom for any entrepreneur looking to make moves in the technology industry. Here is a summary as I see it.
- The focus is the product
- The product should serve the customer’s interest in the best possible way
- Equip the customer with the knowledge to make the product work for them
- Strong leads and mind share will lead to outstanding growth if you have an outstanding product
- Always make a WIN-WIN
- Track every metric that is useful for you and your customers
- Never let sales drive your product, let your product drive sales
- Iterate, innovate, and support
- Learn about your customers failures, and learn ways to mitigate them in the future
If you are looking to monetize a cool product or service - follow the same instincts that allowed you to develop your product. Innovation is key. But you have to learn to look at more than bug reports. Metrics and feedback are the lifeblood that you need to iterate your product. As long as you are a leader in innovation and support, you can monetize without pushing the hard sale.
So maybe they were right when they said, “If you build, they will come.”
Note: Edit made to correct Groupon’s valuation ahead of IPO. I incorrectly stated $1 Billion, which is in fact the value of their latest round of funding.



